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Abstract
Recent work on the development of a dialogical approach to the logic of fi ction 
stresses the notion of existence as choice. Moreover, this approach to existence 
has been combined with the notion of ontological dependence as deployed 
by A. Thomasson’s artifactual theory of fi ction. In order to implement such 
a combination within the dialogical frame several predicates of ontological 
dependence have been defi ned. However, the defi nition of such predicates seems 
to lean on a model-theoretic semantics for modal logic after all. The main aim 
of the present paper is to set a dialogical frame for the study of fi ctions in the 
context of the dialogical approach of CTT recently developed by S. Rahman and 
N. Clerbout where a fully-interpreted language is unfolded. We will herewith 
develop the idea that in such a setting fi ctional entities are understood as 
hypothetical objects, that is, objects (functions) the existence of which is dependent 
upon one or more hypotheses that restrict the scope of choices available. We will 
fi nish the paper by suggesting that this provides both a natural and genuinely 
dialogical way to understand R. Frigg’s take on scientifi c models as fi ctions and 
a new perspective on Thomasson’s notion of generic ontological dependence.
Keywords: fi ction, dialogues, dialogical logic, hypothetical objects, scientifi c 
models.
Resumo
Trabalhos recentes sobre o desenvolvimento de uma abordagem dialógica para 
a lógica da fi cção enfatizam a noção de existência como escolha. Além disso, 
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esta abordagem da existência tem-se combinado com a noção de dependência 
ontológica implantado pela teoria artefactual da fi cção de A. Thomasson. A fi m 
de implementar essa combinação dentro do quadro dialógico, foram defi nidos 
vários predicados de dependência ontológica. No entanto, a defi nição de tais 
predicados parece basear-se em uma semântica do modelo teórico para a 
lógica modal, afi nal. O objetivo do presente trabalho é estabelecer um quadro 
dialógico para o estudo de fi cções no contexto da abordagem dialógica dos CTT 
recentemente desenvolvida por S. Rahman e N. Clerbout, onde uma linguagem 
totalmente interpretada é desdobrada. Vamos, com isto, desenvolver a ideia 
de que, em tal cenário, as entidades fi ccionais são entendidas como objetos 
hipotéticos, ou seja, objetos (funções) cuja existência é dependente de uma ou 
mais hipóteses que restringem o escopo de opções disponíveis. Vamos terminar 
sugerindo que isto fornece uma maneira natural e genuinamente dialógica 
para compreender modelos científi cos como fi cções (Roman Frigg) e uma nova 
perspectiva sobre a noção de dependência ontológica genérica de Thomasson.
Palavras-chave: fi cção, diálogos, lógica dialógica, objetos hipotéticos, modelos 
científi cos.
Introduction
A brief examination of the most recent literature in logic will make it ap-
parent that a host of research in this area is devoted to the study of the interface 
between games, logic and epistemology. These studies provide the basis of ongo-
ing enquiries into the history and philosophy of logic, going from the Indian, the 
Greek, the Arabic, the Obligationes of the Middle Ages to the most contemporary 
developments in the fields of theoretical computer science, computational linguistics, 
artificial intelligence, social sciences and legal reasoning. In fact, a dynamic turn, 
as J. v. Benthem puts it, is taking place where the epistemic aspects of inference 
are linked with game theoretical approaches to meaning4. In regard to the birth 
of this turn, it could be placed around the 1960s, when P. Lorenzen and K. Lorenz 
developed dialogical logic – inspired by Wittgenstein’s language games and math-
ematical game theory – and when some time later Hintikka (1962, 1973) combined 
game-theoretical semantics with epistemic (modal) logic5. However, while Hintikka’s 
approach is based on a model theoretic semantics, the dialogical framework is closer 
to the philosophical tenets underlying constructivism. Indeed, one possible way to 
link dialogues and constructivism is to follow M. Marion’s6 proposal to make use 
of Brandon’s (1994, 2000) pragmatist take on inferentialism. Indeed, Brandon’s 
pragmatist inferentialism is led by two main insights of Kantian origin (combined 
with pragmatism) and one that stems from Brandon’s reading of Hegel, namely (i) 
4 New results in linear logic by Girard at the interfaces between mathematical game theory and proof theory 
on the one hand and between argumentation theory and logic on the other resulted in the work of, among 
others, Abramsky, van Benthem, Blass, van Ditmarsch, Gabbay, Hyland, Hodges, Japaridze, Krabbe, Prakken, 
Sandu, Walton and Woods. They all explore the scope of a new concept of logic in which logic is understood 
as a dynamic instrument of inference.
5 If we were to pinpoint a precise date, the year 1958, the date of publication of Logik und Agon by Lorenzen, 
could be taken to mark the very beginnings of the dynamic turn.
6 In fact, Marion (2006, 2009) was the first to propose a link between Brandom’s pragmatist inferentialism 
and dialogical logic in the context of Hodges’ (2001) challenges to the game theoretical approaches. Another 
relevant antecedent of the present work is the PhD-thesis of Keiff (2007), who provided a thorough formulation 
of dialogical logic within the framework of speech-act theory. 
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judgments are the fundamental units of knowledge, (ii) human cognition and action 
are characterized by certain sorts of normative assessment7 deployed by games of 
giving and asking for reasons, (iii) communication is mainly conceived as coopera-
tion in a joint social activity rather than as sharing contents.8
The crucial point of the epistemic approach is that assertion or judgment 
amounts to a knowledge claim. So, if meaning of an expression is deployed from 
its role in assertions (the linguistic expressions of judgments), then an epistemic 
approach to meaning results. In relation to the second point, Brandon implements 
the normative aspect with the help of Sellar’s (1954) notion of games of giving and 
asking for reasons. Indeed, in Brandon’s view, it is the chain of commitments and 
entitlements in a game of giving and asking for reasons that tights up judgment 
and inference.9 Sundholm (2012) provides the following formulation of the notion 
of inference in a communicative context that can be also seen as describing the 
core of Brandon’s pragmatist inferentialism10:
When I say “Therefore” I give others my authority for asserting the conclusion, given 
theirs for asserting the premisses.11
Recent work on dialogical logic develops plays between commitments and 
entitlements in the context of a pragmatics theory of meaning for fictions with the 
help of the notion of existence as choice. In a nutshell: the use of a singular term 
is said to have ontological commitment iff it has been chosen while substituting a 
bounded variable that occurs in an existentially quantified expression. Accordingly, 
in an argumentative context, a proponent is not entitled to the thesis that, say, Vam-
pires exist, by the opponent’s concession that Nosferatu is such a creature –unless 
the opponent has also chosen Nosferatu to defend some existential claim: it is only 
the existential choice-commitments of the opponent that entitle the proponent to 
7 The normative aspect, rooted on the shift from Cartesian certainty to bindingness of rules, distinguishes 
Brandom’s pragmatism of others: “One of the strategies that guided this work is a commitment to the fruitfulness 
of shifting theoretical attention from the Cartesian concern with the grip we have on concepts – for Descartes, 
in the particular form of the centrality of the notion of certainty […] – to the Kantian concern with the grip 
concepts have on us, that is the notion of necessity as the bindingness of the rules (including inferential ones) 
that determine how it is correct to apply those concepts” (Brandom 1994, p. 636).
8 In relation to the model of holistic communication envisaged, Brandom (1994, p. 479) writes: “Holism 
about inferential significances has different theoretical consequences depending on whether one thinks of 
communication in terms of sharing a relation to one and the same thing (grasping a common meaning) or 
in terms of cooperating in a joint activity […]”.
9 Moreover, according to Brandom, games of asking for reasons and giving them constitute the base of any 
linguistic practice: “Sentences are expressions whose unembedded utterance performs a speech act such as 
making a claim, asking a question, or giving a command. Without expressions of this category, there can be 
no speech acts of any kind, and hence no specifically linguistic practice” (Brandom, 2000, p. 125).
10 These remarks have already been pointed out in Clerbout and Rahman (2015), who also notice that although 
Brandom’s approach and the dialogical frame share some important tenets, they are different frames after 
all. More precisely, although the pragmatist approach to meaning of the dialogical framework shares with 
Brandom’s pragmatist inferentialism the claim that the meaning of linguistic expressions is related to their 
role in games of questions and answers and also endorses Brandom’s notion of justification of a judgment as 
involving the interaction of commitments and entitlements, dialogicians maintain that more fundamental lower-
levels should be distinguished (see Appendix I). Those lower-level semantic levels include (i) the description of 
how to formulate a suitable question to a given posit and how to answer it, and (ii) the development of plays, 
constituted by several combinations of sequences of questions and answers brought forward as responses 
to the posit of a thesis. From the dialogical perspective, the level of judgments corresponds to the final stage 
of the chain of interactions just mentioned. More precisely, the justifications of judgments correspond to the 
level of winning strategies, which select those plays that turn out to be relevant for the drawing of inferences. 
11 Actually, Sundholm (2012) bases his formulation on Austin (1961 [1946]). 
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bring forward existential claims.12 The general dialogical approach to fiction has 
been introduced by Rahman et al. (1990), who summarize their proposal in the 
following way: 
Being a pragmatic and not a referential approach to semantics, dialogical logic does 
not understand semantics as mapping names, propositions and relationships into 
the real world to obtain an abstract counterpart of it, but as dealing (handeln) with 
them in a particular way. This allows a very simple formulation of free logic the core 
of which can be expressed in a nutshell, namely: in an argumentation, it sometimes 
makes sense to restrict the introduction of singular terms in the context of quantifi ca-
tion to a formal use of them. That is, the proponent is allowed to use a constant iff this 
constant has been explicitly conceded by the opponent (Rahman et al., 1990, p. 357). 
Since this initial paper further important developments have been published by 
Redmond (2010), Fontaine and Redmond (2011) and Fontaine (2013) that delve into 
both the dialogical structure of several free logics and the dynamics aspects proper 
to argumentative contexts (see Appendix II). Moreover, in the latter publications the 
dialogical approach to existence as choice has been combined with the notion of 
ontological dependence as deployed by Thomasson’s (1999) artifactual theory of 
fiction. In order to implement such a combination several predicates of ontological 
dependence defined purely by dialogical terms have been attempted. However, 
the definition of such predicates seems to lean on a model-theoretic semantics for 
modal logic after all.13 This hinges on a general problem of the standard dialogical 
approach to meaning where the dialogical semantics affects only logical constants. 
In pursuance of filling that gap in the dialogical theory of meaning new researches 
have linked dialogical logic with Per Martin-Löfs (1984) Constructive Type Theory 
(CTT), where a fully-interpreted language is unfolded (see Rahman and Clerbout, 
2013, 2014; Clerbout and Rahman, 2015; Rahman et al., 2015). 
The main aim of the present paper is to set a dialogical frame for the study 
of fictions in the context of the dialogical approach of CTT where fictional entities 
are understood as hypothetical objects, that is, objects (functions) the existence of 
which is dependent upon one or more hypotheses that restrict the scope of choices 
available. Such a reading of fiction as play-objects for open assumptions as resulting 
from a fully interpreted language go along with Brandon’s (1994, p. 636) view on the 
commitments attached to singular terms in games of giving and asking for reasons. 
Let us point out that, as we will briefly discuss at the end of the paper, although 
the frame to be developed herewith aims at fictions of any sort, by its very nature 
it seems to be close to the most recent fictionalist approaches to scientific models 
such as the one of Frigg (2010) and Godfrey-Smith (2006, 2009). In this context, 
if – ontologically speaking14 – models are understood as fictions, this can be ex-
pressed with the claim that models are devices to reason provided some hypotheses 
and that given two hypotheses both deploy possible ways to complete our lack of 
knowledge either by presenting two incompatible alternatives or by establishing a 
relation between them such that the second hypothesis specifies the first one by 
adding information. The hypothetical objects are in fact variables of a certain type 
that require a definition in order to be applied. Moreover, in a dialogical frame, 
12 The idea behind makes use of the dialogical theory of meaning of quantifi ers, where its local semantics is 
given by both a choice and the propositional result of this choice (see Appendices I and II). Rahman et al. 
(1990) introduced a sequence of quantifi ers. 
13 For a modal theoretic semantics of the notion of ontological dependence see Fontaine and Rahman (2013). 
14 In fact, when we say that models are fictions we are claiming that ontologically speaking fictions and models 
are on a par, not that they role or use is the same– see Giere (2009). 
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hypotheses (possible worlds) as specifications are the result of answers to questions 
posed in relation to a given hypothesis. We will finish the paper by suggesting that 
this frame provides a natural and genuinely dialogical way to understand Thomas-
son’s notion of generic ontological dependence.
The Dialogical Frame
Worlds as hypotheses and dialogical free logic revisited
If we are going to deal with fictions and those are to be considered to be 
some kind of objects in a dialogical frame, what we need is to extend this frame in 
such a way that those objects are understood as some kind of intentional objects. 
In fact there is already some work on dialogical modal logic (such as Rahman and 
Rückert, 2001; Redmond and Fontaine, 2011; Clerbout, 2014) where intentional 
objects are formulated within a first-order modal frame. However, this approach 
that makes use of labels is too close to the model-theoretical approach of Kripke’s 
modal logic: in such a setting, labels are names of model-theoretic worlds after all. 
In other words, what we need is a conception where worlds are introduced at the 
object-language level and have a genuine dialogical meaning rather than a meta-
physical nature. Thus, since our aim is to formulate fictional objects as hypothetical 
entities within a dialogical framework, a dialogical CTT-approach to modal logic is 
due. Fortunately, Ranta (1991, 1994) provided one half of the task by developing a 
CTT version of possible world-semantics. What we need now is to combine it with 
the dialogical approach to CTT. 
Let us start with the CTT approach to possible worlds as developed by Ranta 
(1994; and see also Primiero, 2008, p. 150-158). The main idea of Ranta is that an 
assertion relativized to a possible world W amounts to a hypothetical where that 
assertion is brought forward provided the hypothesis W and this is expressed at 
the level of the object-language. In other words, the modal assertions are reduced 
to hypotheticals. Thus, one might say that, in some way, Leibniz’s (metaphysical) 
notion of possible world is placed into Kant’s conception of hypotheticals. Thus, 
what we need is not labels for worlds but assertions that are brought forward dur-
ing a play provided some open assumptions. Accordingly, hypotheses take the place 
of worlds and arbitrary elements (variables) of the hypotheses the proposition is 
dependent on take the place of world-labels. More generally, and independently 
of the dialogical setting, this yields the following correspondences – pointed out 
by Ranta (1991, p. 83):
A : set in W means A(x) : set (x : W)
A = B : I in W means A(x) = B(x) : set ( x : W)
a : A in W means a(x) : A(x) (x : W)
a = b : A in W means a(x) = b(x) : A(x) (x : W)
The CTT take on hypotheses is the following: Asserting A is true provided the 
hypothesis W amounts to the assertion There is a proof of A such that is depen-
dent on some (yet unknown) proof of W. We use a variable x for such a proof in 
the same way as we make use of a variable when considering an arbitrary element 
of a set. In the case of the dialogical approach to CTT, proof-objects only occur at 
the level of strategies, however, at the play level, play-objects provide the ontology 
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suitable for that level. More precisely, while bare play-objects provide the ontology 
of categorical moves, functions (with variables as arguments) provide the play-
objects of hypotheticals. As we will discuss below, hypothetical objects in general 
and fictions in particular are understood in this setting as dependent objects. Let 
us now make use of the translation proposed by Ranta in order to formulate in 
the context of dialogical logic the local meaning of quantifiers brought forward by 
hypothetical moves – and, in doing so, introduce its modal structure at the level of 
the object-language:
In order to avoid a heavy notation we will not write the world variable in 
proposition but we will assume that it occurs free in it; for instance the expression 
b(y) : (x : A) (y : W) should be read as b(y) : [(x : A)j](y) (y : W) (see Table 1).
Table 1. Local meaning of quantifiers with hypotheses.
Posit Challenge Defence
Y ?prop X (x : A) : prop, A, W : set
Y ?L X L
(b(y)) : A (y : W)
X b(y) : (x : A)(y : W) Or Respectively
Y ?R
[the challenger has the 
choice]
X R(b(y)) : (L(b(y))) (y : W)
Y ?prop X (x : A) : prop, A, W : set
X b(y) : (x : A)(y : W) Y L(b(y)) : A (y : W) X R(b(y)) : (L(b(y))(y : W)
The notion of quantification deployed by these rules corresponds to what in 
standard modal logic is known as actualist quantification – i.e., the scope of the 
quantifiers (the variables of which range over W) is circumscribed by the objects 
that “inhabit” W. In our setting this means that the players must choose for their 
moves objects suitable in relation to the hypothetical y : W, i.e. those functions 
defined over de domain W. This yields a new approach to free logic in general and 
to dialogical free logic in particular: One can infer Something is a vampire from 
Nosferatu is a vampire only if the existential is relativized to the same world W upon 
which Nosferatu is dependent. We cannot, for example, infer b(y) : (x : A)Bx(y) 
(y : W), neither from the hypothetical a(z) : Bk(z) (z : V) – where k : A – nor from 
the categorical expression a : Bk – where k : A. From the dialogical perspective the 
point is that, because of the formal rule, in order to win P can only choose those 
play objects that O has chosen before. Thus, since during the plays involving our 
example, O brings forward a(z) : Bk(z) (z : V) in the first example and a : Bk, in the 
second, P will not be able to make a suitable choice that yields a copy-cat of those 
moves of O. Under these circumstances, the closest move that P can obtain is a(y) 
: Bk(y) (y : W) – that will yield a P-win for the first example iff V = W and a win in 
the second example iff there is no (more) hypothesis. More generally, the follow-
ing tautological hypothetical implications are valid (there is a winning strategy for 
P) : b(y) : Bk  (x : A)Bx (y : W) and b(y) : (x : A)Bx Bk (y : W) only if the forma-
tion rules for Bx : prop presuppose a set such that this set is dependent upon W.
Notice that this analysis also yields an interpretation of what is happening 
from the point of view of free logic in the so-called Smuyllan formula when for-
mulated as z(u) : (x : A) (Bx y(y : A)By) (u : W) that is quite different from the 
one given by Redmond (2010), Fontaine and Redmond (2011) and Fontaine (2013) 
(see Appendix II). Indeed, the dynamics involved here is the dynamics triggered by 
8Filosofi a Unisinos, 16(1):2-21, jan/apr 2015
Shahid Rahman, Juan Redmond
the choices, dependent upon W, within the set A, not by the changes involving the 
ontological status of the play objects within A. 
Now, let us come back to precedent work on dialogical free logic; the point 
is, to put it bluntly, that the notion of existence in an argument amounts to those 
commitments to existence that have been brought forward for the sake of the 
argument at stake. Moreover, since the proponent will copy-cat those existential 
commitments that have been forward for the sake of the argument, the existential 
commitments of both sides are hypothetical or, to make use of D. Walton’s meta-
phorical description, those commitments involve plays of make believe. Neither the 
standard logical nor the standard dialogical notation provides a device to express 
this hypothetical character at the object language level. Now, we know how this can 
be carried out: quantified propositions are made dependent on sets, the elements 
of which are yet unknown play-objects. So long as the arguments of the function 
are unknown, those quantified expressions will continue to be hypothetical and so 
too their concomitant existential choices. 
It is not certain that the usual distinctions, positive, negative, neutral, outer 
domain free logics apply here. If we were prepared to combine the categorical and 
the hypothetical levels, we might understand the CTT-approach as describing some 
kind of supervaluational interpretation of outer domain free logics. However, the 
comparison is rather analogical, since the CTT-approach does not make use of model 
theoretic semantics that provides the reference of singular terms. Be that as it may, 
we must delve into the following questions: What corresponds to the accessibility 
relation of standard modal logic? What is a set W? How do we understand fictional 
objects such as Holmes? The answer to these questions takes us to the next sections. 
What are sets W and how are they structured?
Epistemic alternatives, Accessibility and 
the Dialogical perspective15
One way to see the relation between a world W1 and a world W2 is to see it as 
an epistemic alternative, where W2 is an extension of W1 in the sense that W2 adds 
information in such a way that every proposition that is true under the hypothesis 
W1 is also true under the hypothesis W2. More generally we express this situation 
in the following way: d(y) : W1 (y : W2). Thus, if W2 is accessible from W1, then there 
is a function f from W2 to W1 (see Ranta, 1994, p. 147). But certainly there might 
be many such functions that express not only that W2 from W1 but also that, say, 
V and U are accessible too from W1, although W2, V, U are not accessible between 
them. The whole yields a tree structure with W1 as its root. In the dialogical frame 
the point is that if it is the case that a(b(y)) : A (b(y) : W (y : V)), and a(x)) : A(x : W), 
then players can bring forward b(y) : A (y : V). Interesting is the fact that one way to 
understand a(b(y)) is the variant of the object a(x) when ‘transferred’ to the world 
V. If the language contains modal operators, the relation between W and V can 
also be brought dynamically into the play by the choices of the players as is usual 
in dialogical modal logic (Rahman and Rückert, 2001); however, for the purpose of 
the present study of hypothetical objects such operators are not needed. 
15 For the CTT approach to the notion of possible worlds in the present and the following sections we follow 
Ranta (1991, 1994).
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Worlds as Contexts 
We still do not know exactly what the sets W are and in what sense they 
can be understood as expressing the idea of “possible world”. Recall that in this 
context each world W, V, U is a set – where such a set is a hypothesis. What we 
need to elucidate is both, what the elements of this set are and in what sense 
the notion of hypothesis captures the idea of possible. Let us start with the lat-
ter. From the epistemic point of view, “possible” means different alternatives of 
adding knowledge provided full knowledge has not been yet achieved. Ranta 
(1991, p. 78) links this notion of possibility with Husserl’s (Cart. Med., p. 62) 
conception of different ways of completing what I know. Here we are then, in 
such a frame, possible means that there are (at the disposal of the epistemic 
agent) several alternative ways of completing not yet achieved full knowledge. 
Moreover, this means that possible is always an approximation to full knowledge: 
if the approximation were to end, then possibility would not be any more there, 
but full knowledge. Possible is that which can always be completed. But how 
to express this notion formally and how to link it with the dialogical approach? 
Formally speaking, a possible world is itself a set constituted by a sequence of 
hypothetical assertions with a dependence defined between them (this structure 
is called a context). Let us call  the sequence that approximates a world, then 
we have 
a : A in  means a(x1, …, xn) : A(x1, …, xn) (x1 : A1, …, xn : An(x1, …, xn-1))
and something similar applies to: A : set in , A = B : set in , and a = b : A in 
As mentioned above, if contexts should capture the notion of possible world, 
it is important that the approximations never end. Thus, as pointed out by Ranta 
(1991, p. 93), worlds are a kind of limits of sequences of hypothetical assertions 
further and further specified – without ever reaching full specification. In fact there 
are two ways to extend a context by adding information to it, and one by reducing 
uncertainty in it, namely:
(1)  By adding a further hypothesis. It may happen that the new proposition, 
say, A(x1, …, xn) be potentially true in  (that is, when the new proposi-
tion can be inferred from the original context – then there is growth only 
in actual knowledge), but it could also add a new piece of information.
(2)  By introducing a definition for some variables and achieving in this way 
a reduction of uncertainty. For instance, the context
  = (x1 : A1, ... xn : An ) is extended to  , xk = c : Ak
  so that in the new context every occurrence of xk is substituted by a. The 
new context is obtained from  by removing the hypothesis xk : Ak by 
c(x1 ... xn). Thus the new context is shorter than the original one. Still, this 
operation furnishes not only the knowledge of the original context but 
the value of the one variable reduces the uncertainty within the context.
(3)  By presenting a new context  such that there is function f from  to  
as explained in II.2.1
As observed by Ranta (1994, p. 146-47), (1) and (2) can be seen as special 
cases of (3). Thus (3) provides the most general case of extension and, at the same 
time, deploys the constructive meaning of the notion of accessibility. Dialogically 
speaking, extensions of contexts are to be understood as answers to questions of 
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specification – recall that we are dealing with a fully interpreted language. Assume 
that one player brings forward the hypothetical that there is a play object for A(y), 
provided x is a living being, y is a human(x). Then the first kind of extension will 
the triggered by a question such as is (s)he European or Asian?. The second kind of 
extension will be triggered by a wh-question (that is a who, what or when ques-
tion). The third kind of extension can be thought as asking the defender to establish 
a link between the variables of the first and the new context. Assume for instance 
that the initial context  contains the disjunction A  B the hypothetical play object 
of which is the variable x. Assume further on that the new context  contains y : 
A. In such a case the player that claims that  is an extension of  must produce 
the definition L (x) = y : A  B, and something similar must happen in relation to 
every component of .
Summing up, from the dialogical perspective modality amounts to a dialogue 
where moves involve questions and answers in relation to underlying contexts. 
Let us finish this section by pointing out that, in relation to the second way 
of adding knowledge by reducing uncertainty, Martin-Löf suggested, in a series 
of lectures on choice sequences in 1990-1991, that it should be understood as 
the growth of knowledge in the context of scientific experimentation, where an 
unknown quantity is given a value but the function is still dependent on other 
unknown elements. As we will mention in the conclusions, we think that this way 
of extending a contexts is quite fruitful to understand the role of scientific mod-
els within a fictionalist approach to them. This requires reflecting – in the frame 
so far developed – on what the features of hypothetical entities are. We cannot 
study here these features in detail – our main aim was to develop a formal frame 
for the thorough study of this topic – but a brief discussion will show what the 
issue is about. 
Conclusions: Hypothetical objects 
as fictions and scientific models
Ranta (1994, p. 135) defends the idea that fictional characters represent arbi-
trary objects of the suitable kind: they are variables (a similar idea was defended by 
Nelson Goodman). It is the background knowledge of the reader that might extend 
the context by defining one given variable. When speaking of fictional characters 
in literature, the point might be controversial, but if we are thinking of scientific 
models as fictions – as defended by, among others, Godfrey-Smith (2006, 2009) 
and Frigg (2010), the corresponding hypothetical objects can certainly be seen as 
variables that in order to be applied require a definition (in the sense of extension 
by definition as mentioned above) or some other kind of further specification. 
Certainly, as pointed out already, it is only at the ontological level that fictions and 
models are on a par, not in their use or role. In this respect, we agree with Giere’s 
(2009) remarks that the use of a scientific model is not the same as the use of a work 
of fiction and that ignoring such a distinction can even be dangerous16. In order 
to avoid mixing the ontological with the epistemological role, Giere recommends 
to substitute, in the case of models, the word fiction by a new denomination that 
also stresses the pragmatics character. Our frame proposes an adequate substitute, 
namely hypothetical objects. If we follow this path, objects described by models are 
variables that can only be approximated to a target system. However, the entities 
16 Giere (2009, p. 257-258) recalls in this context the misuse Creationists make of Popper’s early remarks that 
evolutionary theory is not a scientifi c one. 
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of models are experimental (hypothetical) objects of some type and thus are not 
fixed to any object in particular. Let us quote here a passage from Frigg’s (2010) 
paper on Models and Fiction:
But once we acknowledge that these descriptions describe hypothetical systems 
rather than real target systems, we also have to acknowledge that hypothetical 
systems are an important part of the theoretical apparatus we employ, and that 
they therefore have to be included in our analysis of how scientifi c modelling 
works. This can, of course, be done in different ways. My suggestion is that these 
hypothetical systems in fact are the models systems we try to understand, and I 
therefore I reserve the term ‘model system’ for the hypothetical physical entities 
described by the descriptions we use to ground structural claims (Frigg, 2010, 
p. 259).
The dialogical interpretation adds the interactive component: specifications 
of the contexts that define a model are the result of questions and answers for-
mulated during the search for growth of knowledge. Relevant to our discussion is 
Frigg’s (2010, p. 17-19, footnote 19) observation that the worlds he has in mind 
are never complete and that the link between the target system and the model 
is not one of reference but of a game of make believe. Once more, the analogy 
to games of make believe should not lead to conflate the use of fictional works 
and scientific models. Indeed, anchoring the hypothetical objects of a context in 
the context of the target system can be seen as a game of make believe, but his 
anchoring reduces – to some degree – uncertainty in relation to the target system. 
A thorough study that differentiates the anchoring (by approximation) of hypo-
thetical objects that constitute scientific models from the anchoring of fictional 
characters in the belief context of an agent is due. However, the combination of 
the games of dialogical logic and the CTT approach to possible worlds looks a 
promising path to explore. 
Let us devote our last words to the notion of fiction as artefact. Following 
Ingarden and Husserl, Thomasson (1999) proposes a realist perspective of the 
fictional characters, which she calls abstract artefacts. Understanding fictional 
characters as artefacts means conceiving them as entities dependent on a singular 
act of creation or birth. Hence they are dependent on an author with whom they 
maintain a historical link (historical ontological dependence) and, at the same 
time, they are dependent on copies of the literary work where they appear (generic 
ontological dependence). This is what allows them to enter into the linguistic 
community of readers and continue to exist. Their status of being is continuously 
restored through these same relationships, that is, they are identifiable through 
these chains of dependence and, ultimately, susceptible to dying (disappearing) 
if these relationships are definitively dissolved. These distinctions of Thomasson 
allow us to think in a bipolar domain: on the one hand, the dependent entities 
and, on the other hand, the entities on which they depend (which corresponds 
to the classical distinction between the real and the fictitious). It should be clear 
that hypothetical objects as defined above are in Thomasson’s sense generically 
dependent objects. Thus, under this perspective the hypothetical object is generi-
cally dependent on some arbitrary unknown element of the context G (that is, 
a variable that instantiates G): this is what generic ultimately means. Historical 
dependence is not difficult to implement either, once we introduce types for tem-
porality (Ranta, 1994, p. 102-124). Once more, a thorough exploration is due. In 
fact, it is part of our work in progress, but, so our claim, the frame for such an 
investigation has been set herewith. 
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Appendix I: Standard Dialogical Logic17
Let L be a first-order language built as is usual upon the propositional con-
nectives, the quantifiers, a denumerable set of individual variables, a denumerable 
set of individual constants and a denumerable set of predicate symbols (each with 
a fixed arity).
We extend the language L with two labels O and P, standing for the players 
of the game, and the two symbols ‘!’ and ‘?’. When the identity of the player does 
not matter, we use variables X or Y (with XY). A move is an expression of the form 
‘X-e’, where e is either of the form ‘!’ for some sentence  of L or of the form 
‘?[!1, …, !n]’. 
The particle (or local) rules for standard dialogical games are given on Table 2.
Table 2. Local meaning of standard logical constants.
Previous move X !  X !  X !  X ! 
Challenge Y ? [ !] orY ? [ !] Y ? [ ! , ! ] Y !  Y ! 
Defence X ! resp. X ! 
X ! 
or X !  X !  – –
Previous move X ! x X ! x
Challenge Y ? [!(x/ai)] Y [! (x/a1),...,!(x/an)]
Defence X ! (x/ai) X ! (x/ai)with 1 i n
In this table, the ais are individual constants and (x/ai) denotes the formula 
obtained by replacing every free occurrence of x in  by ai. When a move consists 
in a question of the form ‘? [ ! 1,...,!n]’, the other player chooses one formula 
among 1,..., n and plays it. We thus distinguish conjunction from disjunction and 
universal quantification from existential quantification in terms of which player 
chooses. With conjunction and universal quantification, the challenger chooses 
which formula he asks for. With disjunction and existential quantification, it is the 
defender who can choose between various formulas. Notice that there is no defence 
in the particle rule for negation. Particle rules provide an abstract description of how 
the game can proceed locally: they specify the way a formula can be challenged 
and defended according to its main logical constant. In this way the particle rules 
govern the local level of meaning. Strictly speaking, the expressions occurring in 
the table above are not actual moves because they feature formula schemata and 
the players are not specified. Moreover, these rules are indifferent to any particular 
situations that might occur during the game. For these reasons we say that the 
description provided by the particle rules is abstract.
17 The following brief presentation of standard dialogical logic is based on Clerbout (2013). The main original 
papers on dialogical logic are collected in Lorenzen and Lorenz (1978). For a historical overview see Lorenz 
(2001). Other papers have been collected more recently in Lorenz (2008, 2010a, 2010b). A detailed account of 
recent developments can be found in Rahman and Keiff (2005) and Keiff (2009). For the underlying metalogic 
see Clerbout (2013, 2014). For a textbook presentation: Redmond and Fontaine (2011) and Rückert (2011). For 
the key role of dialogic in regaining the link between dialectics and logic, see Keiff (2009), Rahman and Keiff 
(2010). Fiutek et al. (2010) study the dialogical approach to belief revision. Clerbout et al. (2011) study Jain 
Logic in the dialogical framework. Popek (2012, p. 223-244) develops a dialogical reconstruction of medieval 
obligationes. See also Magnier (2013) on dynamic epistemic logic and legal reasoning in a dialogical framework.
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Since the players’ identities are not specified in these rules, particle rules are 
symmetric: the rules are the same for the two players. The local meaning being sym-
metric (in this sense) is one of the greatest strengths of the dialogical approach to 
meaning. This is in particular the reason why the dialogical approach is immune to 
a wide range of trivializing connectives such as Prior’s tonk (see Rahman and Red-
mond, 2016). The expressions occurring in particle rules are all move schematas. The 
words “challenge” and “defence” are convenient to name certain moves according 
to their relation with other moves which can be defined in the following way. Let 
 be a sequence of moves. The function p assigns a position to each move in , 
starting with 0. The function F assigns a pair [m,Z] to certain moves N in , where 
m denotes a position smaller than p(N) and Z is either C or D, standing respectively 
for “challenge” and “defence”. That is, the function F keeps track of the relations of 
challenge and defence as they are given by the particle rules. Consider for example 
the following sequence :
P ! , P ! , O ? [ ! ], P ! 
In this sequence we have for example p(P ! ) = 1. A play is a legal se-
quence of moves, i.e., a sequence of moves which observes the game rules. Particle 
rules are not the only rules which must be observed in this respect. In fact, it can 
be said that the second kind of rules named structural rules are the ones giving the 
precise conditions under which a given sentence is a play. The dialogical game for , 
written D(), is the set of all plays with  being the thesis (see the Starting rule 
below). The structural rules are the following:
SR0 (Starting rule). Let  be a complex sentence of L and i, j be positive 
integers. For every D() we have:
• p( P ! )=0,
• p( O n:=i)=1,
• p( P m:=j)=2.
In other words, any play  in D() starts with P positing . We call  the 
thesis of both the play and the dialogical game. After that, the Opponent and the 
Proponent successively choose a positive integer called repetition rank. The role of 
these integers is to ensure that every play ends after finitely many moves in the way 
specified by the next structural rule.
SR1 (Classical game-playing rule). Let  D(). For every Min  with p(M)>2 we 
have F(M)=[m’,Z] with m’<p(M) and Z{C,D}. Let r be the repetition rank of player 
X and D() such that
• the last member of  is a Y-move,
• M0 is a Y-move of position m0 in ,
• M1,...,Mn are X-moves in  such that F(M1)=...F(Mn)=[m0,Z].
Consider the sequence18 ’=*N where N is an X-move such that F’(N)=[m0,Z]. 
We have ’D() only if n<r.
The first part of the rule states that every move after the repetition rank 
choices is either a challenge or a defence. The second part ensures finiteness of 
18 We use *N to denote the sequence obtained by adding move N to the play .
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plays by setting the player’s repetition rank as the maximum number of times he 
can challenge or defend against a given move by the other player.
SR2 (Formal rule). Let  be an elementary sentence, N be the move P !  and M 
be the move O ! . A sequence  of moves is a play only if we have: if N then 
M and p(M)<p(N).
That is, the Proponent can play an elementary sentence only if the Opponent 
has played it previously. The Formal rule is one of the characteristic features of the 
dialogical approach: other game-based approaches do not have it. Indeed with this 
rule the dialogical framework comes with an internal account for elementary sen-
tences: an account in terms of interaction only, without depending on metalogical 
meaning explanations for the non-logical vocabulary. More prominently, this means 
that the dialogical account does not rely – contrary to Hintikka’s GTS games – on 
the model-theoretical approach to meaning for atomic formulas.
Here is some terminology for the last structural rule in standard dialogical 
games. A play is called terminal when it cannot be extended by further moves in 
compliance with the rules. We say it is X-terminal when the last move in the play 
is an X-move.
SR3 (Winning rule). Player X wins the play  only if it is X-terminal.
Consider for example the following sequences of moves:
P ! Q(a)Q(b), O-n:=1, P m:=6, O-?[Q(a)], P ! Q(a)
P ! Q(a)Q(a), O-n:=1, P m:=12, O ! Q(a) P ! Q(a)
The first one is not a play because it breaks the Formal rule: with his last 
move, the Proponent plays an elementary sentence which the Opponent has not 
played beforehand. By contrast, the second sequence is a play in D(P! QaQa). 




1 n:=1 m:=12 2
3 !Q(a) (0) !Q(a) 4
The numbers in the external columns are the position of the moves in the 
play. When a move is a challenge, the position of the challenged move is indicated 
in the internal columns, as with move 3 in this example. Notice that such tables 
carry the information given by the functions p and F in addition to representing 
the play itself.
However, when we want to consider several plays together – for example 
when building a strategy – such tables are not that perspicuous. So we do not use 
them to deal with dialogical games for which we prefer another perspective. The 
extensive form of the dialogical game D() is simply the tree representation of it, 
also often called the game-tree. More precisely, the extensive form E of D() is the 
tree (T,l,S) such that:
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•  There is a unique t0 (the root) in T such that l(t0)=0, and t0 is labelled with 
the thesis of the game,
• For every tt0 there is a unique t’ such that t’St,
• For every t and t’ in T, if tSt’ then l(t’)=l(t)+1,
•  Let D() such that p(M’)=p(M)+1. If t and t’ are respectively labelled 
with M and M’, then tSt’.
Many dialogical game metalogical results are obtained by leaving the level of 
rules and plays to move to the level of strategies. Significant among these results 
are the ones concerning the existence of winning strategies for a player. We will 
now define these notions and give examples of such results.
A strategy for player X in D() is a function which assigns an X-move M to 
every non-terminal play  having a Y-move as last member such that extending 
 with M results in a play. An X-strategy is winning if playing according to it leads 
to X’s victory no matter how Y plays.
Strategies can be considered from the perspective of extensive forms: the ex-
tensive form of an X-strategy s in D() is the tree-fragment S=(Ts,ls,Ss) of E such that: 
(i) The root of S is the root of E,
(ii)  Given a node t in E labelled with an X-move, we have t’Ts and tSst’ 
whenever tSt’.
(iii)  Given a node t in E labelled with a Y-move and with at least one t’ such 
that tSt’, we have a unique s(t) in Ts with tSss(t) and s(t) is labelled with 
the X-move prescribed by s.
Here are some results pertaining to the level of strategies:19
•  Winning P-strategies and leaves. Let w be a winning P-strategy in D(). Then 
every leaf in the extensive form W of w is labelled with a P elementary 
sentence.
•  Determinacy. There is a winning X-strategy in D() if and only if there is no 
winning Y-strategy in D().
•  Soundness and Completeness of Tableaux. Consider first-order tableaux 
and first-order dialogical games. There is a tableau proof for  if and only 
if there is a winning P-strategy in D().
The fact that existence of a winning P-strategy coincides with validity (there is 
a winning P-strategy in D() if and only if  is valid) follows from the soundness and 
completeness of the tableau method with respect to model-theoretical semantics.
Regarding several results, extensive forms of strategies have key parts: one of 
the parts of a winning strategy, called the core of the strategy, is actually that on 
which one works when considering translation algorithms such as the procedures. 
The basic idea behind the notion of core is to get rid of redundant information (for 
example, different orders of moves) which we find in extensive forms of strategies 
(see Clerbout and Rahman, 2015).
19 These results are proven, together with others, in Clerbout (2014).
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Appendix II: The Dialogical Approach 
to Free Logic
The existential presuppositions related to singular terms of standard classical 
logic can be made explicit through the analysis of the following axioms (that are 
related to the obvious inferential rules):
x [x/ki] (Specification)
[x/ki]  x (Particularisation)
Any logic that includes these two principles is ontologically committed with 
respect to its singular terms. One way to free oneself from this commitment is to 
maintain the reach (classical) of the quantifiers, but broaden the referentiality of 
the singular terms that lead to a double domain (outer and inner). This would col-
lapse the two principles and validate the following definition of Hintikka (1966): 
E!(a) = def x(x = a). By means of the predicate E! then the presupposition of existence 
in the assertions is made explicit. You may also think of a semantic with Meinongian 
quantifiers, which would yield – following Priest (2005, p. 14-15) – the following:
“All existent things are such that…” : x[x] =df x(E!x[x]);
“There exists something such that…” : x[x] =df x(E!x  [x]).
Notice that making these presuppositions explicit forces us to confront the 
philosophical difficulties of considering existence as a certain type of property 
of things. For the pragmatic approach that we have chosen, the meaning of the 
quantifiers results from the interactions between an action and a proposition. That 
is, between the action of choosing a constant of substitution and the proposition 
that results from this action – an interesting antecedent can be found in the work 
of Jaskowski (1934), who proposes to make use of assumptions that express the 
introduction of singular terms at the object-language.
The first developments on dialogical free logic (such as Rahman et al., 1990) 
regulate the interaction between choices and propositions by means of a special 
structural rule called the “rule of introduction”.
Rule of Introduction: Let us say that singular term ki played by X has been 
introduced if: X brings forward [x/ki] to defend an existential expression of the 
form x, or if X attacks x con < ?-x/ki >, where ki does not occur in the play 
before. Only O can introduce singular terms.
With this rule both – specification and particularisation – are invalidated. 
O P O P
Ak1xAx 0 xAxAk1 0
1 Ak1 0 xAx 2 1 xAx 0
3 ?- 2
One of the most remarkable consequences of this logic is that all the formulas 
that start with an existential quantifier are invalid. Redmond and Fontaine remedi-
ated this shortcoming (in Redmond, 2010; Fontaine and Redmond, 2011; Fontaine, 
2013) with what has been called a dynamic free logic that amounts to the following 
reformulation of the structural rule for free logic:
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Let us say that singular term ki played by X has been introduced if: X brings 
forward [x/ki] to defend an existential expression of the form x, or if X attacks x with < ?-x/ki >, where ki does not occur in the play before. P can make use of 
singular term only iff this singular term is absolutely new in the play or has been 
introduced by O before.
Appendix III: The Dialogical Approach to CTT20
The dialogical approach to CTT starts with play-objects rather than with 
proof-objects. Proof-objects are a subset of the former, namely those that constitute 
a winning strategy. Before delving into the details about play-objects, let us first 
discuss the issue of the formation of expressions, and in particular of propositions, 
in the context of dialogical logic.
The Formation of Propositions
In standard dialogical systems there is a presupposition that the players use 
well-formed formulas (wff’s). One can check well-formedness at will, but only via 
the usual metareasoning by which one checks that the formula indeed observes 
the definition of wff. The first addendum we want to make is to allow players to 
question the status of expressions, in particular to question the status of something 
as actually standing for a proposition. Thus we start with rules giving a dialogical 
explanation of the formation of propositions. These are local rules added to the 
particle rules which give the local meaning of logical constants (see next section).
Let us make a remark before displaying the formation rules. Because the 
dialogical theory of meaning is based on argumentative interaction, dialogues fea-
ture expressions which are not posits or sentences. They also feature requests used 
as challenges, as illustrated by the formation rules below and the particle rules in 
the next section. Now, by the No entity without type principle, the type of these 
actions, which type we shall write “formation-request”, should be specified during 
a dialogue (see Table 3).21
Table 3. The formation-rules.
Posit Challenge
[when different challenges 
are possible, the challenger 
chooses]
Defence





X ! a1 : , X ! a2 : , …
(X gives the canonical ele-
ments of )
X ! ai :   aj : 
(X provides a generation 
method for )
(X gives the equality 
rule for 
20 The present overview on the dialogical approach to CTT is based on Rahman and Clerbout (2013, 2014) 
and Clerbout and Rahman (2015). 
21 Such a move could be written as “?F1 : formation-request”.
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X !  : prop
X !  : prop




X !  : prop
X !  : prop




X !  : prop
X !  : prop




X ! A : set
X ! (x) : prop (x : A)




X ! A : set
X ! (x) : prop (x : A)
X ! B(k) : prop
(for atomic B)
Y ?F X sic (n)
(X indicates that Y 
posited it at move n)
X !  : prop – –
Note: (*) Equality rules are presented in the next section.
By definition the falsum symbol  is of type prop. Therefore the formation 
of a posit of the form  cannot be challenged.
The next rule is not a formation rule per se but rather a substitution rule.22
Posit-substitution
There are two cases in which Y can ask X to make a substitution in the context 
xi : Ai. The first one is when in a standard play a variable (or a list of variables) occurs 
in a posit with a proviso. Then the challenger posits an instantiation of the proviso:
Posit Challenge Defence
X ! (x1, …, xn) (xi : Ai) Y ! 1 : A1, …, n : An X ! (1 …n)
The second case is in a formation-play. In such a play the challenger simply 
posits the whole assumption as in Move 7 of the example below:
Posit Challenge Defence
X ! (1, …, n) (i : Ai) Y ! 1 : A1, …, n : An X ! (1, …, n)
Play objects. The idea is now to design dialogical games in which the players’ 
posits are of the form “p : ” and acquire their meaning in the way they are used 
in the game – i.e., how they are challenged and defended. This requires, among 
other things, analysing the form of a given play-object p, which depends on , and 
how a play-object can be obtained from other, simpler, play-objects. The standard 
dialogical semantics for logical constants gives us the needed information for this 
purpose. The main logical constant of the expression at stake provides the basic 
information as to what a play-object for that expression consists of:
22 It is an application of the original rule from CTT given in Ranta (1994, p. 30).
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A play for X  is obtained from two plays p1 and p2, where p1 is a play for 
X  and p2 is a play for X . According to the particle rule for disjunction, it is the 
player X who can switch from p1 to p2 and vice-versa.
A play for X  is obtained similarly, except that it is the player Y who can 
switch from p1 to p2.
A play for X    is obtained from two plays p1 and p2, where p1 is a play 
for Y  and p2 is a play for X . It is the player X who can switch from p1 to p2.
The standard dialogical particle rule for negation rests on the interpretation 
of  as an abbreviation for   , although it is usually left implicit. It follows 
that a play for X  is also of the form of a material implication, where p1 is a play 
for Y  and p2 is a play for X , and where X can switch from p1 to p2.
As for quantifiers, we are dealing with quantifiers for which the type of the 
bound variable is always specified by a set. This brings us to Table 5.
Table 5. Local meaning of logical constants in a CTT-setting.
Posit Challenge Defence
X ! 
(where no play-object has 
been specified for )
Y ? play-object X ! p : 
X ! p :  Y ?[/
X ! L(p) : 
Or
X ! R(p) : 
[the defender has the choice]






X ! L(p) : 
respectively
X ! R(p) : 
X ! p :    Y ! L(p) :  X ! R(p) : 
X ! p :  Y L(p) :  X R(p) : 






X ! L(p) : A
Respectively
X ! R(p) : (L(p))
Y ?prop X ! (x : A) : prop
X ! p : (x : A) Y ! L(p) : A X ! R(p) : (L(p))
X ! p : B(k)
(for atomic B) Y ?
X sic (n)
(X indicates that Y posited 
it at move n)
It may happen that the form of a play-object is not explicit at first. In such 
cases we deal with expressions of the form, e.g., “p : ”. In the relevant chal-
lenges and defences, we then use expressions such as L(p) and R(p) used in our 
example. We call these expressions instructions. Their respective interpretations are 
“take the left part of p” and “take the right part of p”. In instructions we indicate 
the logical constant at stake: it keeps the formulations explicit enough, in particular 
in the case of embedded instructions. We must also keep in mind the important 
differences between play-objects depending on the logical constant that is used. 
Consider for example the case of conjunction and disjunction:
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•  A play-object p for a disjunction is composed by two play-objects, but each 
of them constitutes a sufficient play-object for the disjunction. Moreover it 
is the defender who makes the choice between L(p) and R(p).
•  A play-object p for a conjunction is also composed by two play-objects, 
but this time the two of them are necessary to constitute the one for the 
conjunction. It is then the challenger’s privilege to ask for either or both 
(provided the other rules allow him to do so).
Accordingly, L(p) and L(p), say, are actually different things and the notation 
takes that into account.
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